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all the factors involved in a given situation, and in the case of corporal
punishment it is necessary to consider the potential abuse of the privilege to inflict the punishment as well as the burden of procedures and
the potential harm to the student. An Indiana court has observed that
"[T]he practice of corporal punishment has an inherent proneness to
abuse," 4 and in view of the control that a teacher exercises over students, the frequency or severity of the punishment cannot be controlled
by defining permissible punishment as that which is "reasonable." In
Jackson Justice Blackmun noted that such regulations are easily circumvented and that where "power to punish is granted to persons in
lower levels of administrative authority, there is an inherent and natural
difficulty in enforcing the limitations of that power."41
Requiring authorization prior to the infliction of the punishment
or requiring that the punishment be inflicted only in the presence of
another adult would go far to eliminate the potential abuse of corporal
punishment. The imposition of such minimal procedures in the context
of secondary schools would not unduly burden school authorities in their
attempt to maintain discipline and control among their students but
would be an important step in guaranteeing the full constitutional rights
of those who attend public schools.
JOHN C. LILLIE

Criminal Law-Reflections: Insanity, Bifurcation, Burden of Proof
Can an insane person "intend to commit a crime"? May the state
exclude evidence of his mental disorder at the trial of his guilt? May it
require him to disprove his sanity during the separate trial of that issue?
The threshold question may be answered in the affirmative: In some
superficial sense, at least, insane persons intend the crimes they commit.
Yet the mens rea required for a crime such as homicide has commonly
been supposed to connote something more profound.'
This note will examine these and other questions as singularly highlighted in the context of the bifurcated trial procedure. Recent Wiscon-

"Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853).
"1404 F.2d at 579.

'See generally MODEL
authorities cited therein.

PENAL CODE

§ 2.02, Comments 1-4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) and
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sin cases answering each of the above questions will provide the perspective for our examination.
In Sprague v. State' the defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. During an argument, he had pushed his wife down the basement
stairs and then had struck her several times with a nearby board, killing
her. At trial the sole defense offered was that defendant had experienced
a psychomotor epileptic seizure 3 which had rendered him incapable of
forming the specific intent required for first degree murder. Defendant
elected to be tried in a bifurcated procedure, thereby gaining the benefit
of the Model Penal Code definition of insanity but assuming the burden
of proof on that issue. During the trial to determine guilt, medical
testimony and electroencephalograms tending to substantiate his claim
of epileptic seizure were excluded, as was testimony tending to rebut the
contention. The Wisconsin Supreme Court found these rulings proper4
and thereby approved an exclusionary rule which substantially removes
the issue of mens rea from that portion of trial at which guilt and degree
of offense are determined. This was done despite Wisconsin's statutory
definitions of homicide, which require "the mental purpose to take the
life of another human being" for first degree murder5 and "conduct
evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life"' for second degree
murder.
Sprague is the latest decision in what has been termed "the Wisconsin experiment, ' 7 which was begun in 1966 in State v. Schoffner. There,
defendant claimed that he was a paranoid schizophrenic and that he
lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements
252 Wis. 2d 89, 187 N.W.2d 784 (1971).
3W. NEUSTATTER, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISORDER AND CRIME 123 (1957) describes a psychomo.
tor epileptic seizure. The author says the "fit" is "a peculiar psychological state" in which
[t]he patient apparently lapses into a dreamy condition where he feels temporarily
abstracted rather as if he were in a trance. . . . Post epileptic automatism sometimes
follows psychomotor epilepsy. . . . It is characterised by the performance of a number
of quite automatic acts, which may, nevertheless, appear purposeful to an observer.
Id. at 123.
152 Wis. 2d at __,
187 N.W.2d at 788.
'WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (1958).
I1d. § 940.02.
'Note, Criminal Law-Burden of Prooffor Insanity Defense, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 969, 977.
'31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966). M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843):
[T]o establish a defense on the ground'of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the
time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.
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of the law, although admittedly he understood the nature and quality
of his acts and was able to differentiate between right and wrong. The
court divided evenly on the question whether the M'Naghten test of
insanity' or the alternative posed by the Model Penal Code0 would be
applied." In the ensuing compromise, the Schoffner court created an
optional procedure whereby a defendant could, as Schoffner and
Sprague did assume the burden of proof as to his insanity and gain the
benefit of the Model Penal Code definition of insanity, a test that is
more liberal than the M'Naghten rule. Moreover, the Schoffner
decision allowed a defendant to contend in the alternative that he did
not do the act and that if he did he was insane. Sprague failed to take
advantage of this option.
The exclusionary question raised in Sprague, received its first con2 In Curl the
sideration in Curl v. State."
trial court had admitted, at the
initial guilt phase of the trial, testimony showing that on the day of the
crime defendant had consumed seventeen ounces of whiskey, twelve
Librium pills, and sixteen Darvon pills. Expert testimony showed that
such consumption would have rendered Curl incapable of forming the
specific intent required for the crime of burglary. However, the trial
court excluded evidence that Curl had been hospitalized as a paranoid
schizophrenic some years earlier and that Librium had been prescribed
for this disorder. In upholding the conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court said:
To bifurcate a trial is to separate completely the issue of lack of
accountability due to insanity from the issue of whether the crime was
committed. If the testimony of earlier hospitalizations and mental
condition . . . is also material on the issue of guilt, there would be no
reason to hold split trials.
. . . In the law the dividing line. . . is the test of sanity, whatever
the legal definition of [this term] may be or come to be.'3
The language of Curl, sweeping well beyond its factual basis, was
applied in State v. Hebard.4 The Hebarddefendant denied committing
I

"MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961) inquires whether the defendant lacks either a substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or the substan-

tial capacity to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.
"31 Wis. 2d at 415, 143 N.W.2d at 464-65. The author of the opinion candidly recounted the

division of the court and the way in which the issue was resolved.
"40 Wis. 2d 474, 162 N.W.2d 77 (1968).
"Id. at 484-86, 162 N.W.2d at 82-83.
"50 Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W. 2d 156 (1971).
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the crime and claimed on appeal that the exclusion during the guilt
phase of his trial of evidence of his mental condition was constitutionally
impermissible. Instead of limiting Curl to the reading its facts seemed
to require and holding that the exclusion of the evidence of mental
condition was erroneous, the court appeared to feel the entire Schoffner
procedure was threatened. The court felt that "[i]f the position of
[Hebard] were upheld, more would be involved than a complete reversal
of the reasoning of the Curl Case. The entire matter of permitting
bifurcating trials would have to be re-examined."' 5 This assertion clearly
cannot be justified on logical grounds, for Curl had permitted a limited
inquiry into the defendant's mental state during the guilt phase of trial.
Hebard must therefore be taken as a significant, if unwitting, extension
of the Curl position.
In Sprague, this exclusionary rule was again extended. Sprague's
facts peculiarly silhouette the prejudice that may accrue to a defendant
who chooses to exercise the "Sch6ffner option." Unlike Hebard,
Sprague did not deny the act of which he was accused. Moreover, there
was apparently no doubt that his claim of epileptic seizure would
amount to insanity under any test; the question was whether a seizure
had in fact occurred.' 6 Yet by electing to be judged by the liberal definition of insanity, Sprague was saddled with the burden of proof on that
issue. It seems more than passing strange that the Wisconsin court has
never considered this "bargain" aspect of the Schoffner procedure or
confronted the problems presented when a defendant elects a bifurcated
trial to his obvious prejudice.
Two explanations are possible. First, the Wisconsin court may
believe that the "trade" its procedure sanctions will always prove beneficial to the defendant. Alternatively, it may feel that the allocation of
the burden of proof is of minimal significance.
To the degree that the former explanation differs from the latter,
it is clearly untenable. First, it is quite common for an insanity defense
to fail for lack of proof of impairment at the time of the offense.
Sprague affords an obvious example. Moreover, many types of insanity
result in just the sort of cognitive disorder that the M'Naghten test
purports to evaluate.' 7 It is clear that a defendant with certain disorders
5

1d. at 416-17, 184 N.W. 2d at 161.
"The effect of a seizure has been described as "so clearly incapacitating as to make frivolous
any effort to measure the resulting behavior by the! rules of mens rea." A. GOLDSTEIN, THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 203 (1967).
1TW. NEUSTATTER, supra note 3, at 19-20, 58-59.

1972]

CRIMINAL LAW

would be wise to leave the burden of proving sanity on the state and have
his disorder judged by the M'Naghten rule. If the defendant believed
that his victim was a zombie or a devil in human form, for example, he
would err in electing the Schoffner bifurcated procedure.
The second explanation merits more lengthy examination. In other
contexts the United States Supreme Court has held that the state must
prove all elements of a criminal offense "beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 't 8
Yet in Leland v. Oregon 9 the Court held constitutional an Oregon
statute requiring criminal defendants to establish their insanity beyond
that same reasonable doubt. 21 Paradoxically, the Leland opinion leaves
little doubt that mens rea presupposes sanity. The Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals has noted the grave prejudice done defendants by such a
shifting of the burden of proof and has expressed doubts about its
continued constitutional viability.2' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has not recently considered the issue.
Besides Wisconsin, four state courts have recently considered the
constitutionality of resting the burden of proving insanity on the defendant. Unlike Wisconsin, however, these courts have thought the issue
of critical significance.
In State v. Cuevas22 the Hawaii Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that required the defendant to disprove the existence of
malice aforethought once the state had shown that he had done the act.
"'[T]he burden of proof,' " the court said, "' is never upon the accused
to establish his innocence, or to disprove those facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is indicated.' "213 The Hawaii court had
previously held that mental defects not amounting to insanity may negative the ability to formulate specific intent to kill or to harbor malice
aforethought.2 This linking of issues necessarily implies that in the
Hawaii view the existence of mens rea requires sanity and thus makes
it apparent that the Cuevas holding includes shifting the burden on
insanity within its constitutional ban.
Similarly, in People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court, 5 the Colorado
Supreme Court struck down a statute shifting the burden of proving
"9E.g., In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

19343 U.S. 790 (1952).

"Id. at 794-95.
2Timmons v. Peyton, 360 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1966).
.. __Hawaii___, 488 P.2d 322 (1971).
mId. at -,
488 P.2d at 324, quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487 (1895).
"State v. Moeller, 50 Hawaii 110, 433 P.2d 136 (1967).
2165 Colo. 253, 439 P.2d 741 (1968).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

insanity to the defendant as being violative of the due process clause of
the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado court observed that the state
must prove all elements of the offense charged. 6 The court looked to
an earlier Colorado case, Becksted v. People,27 which involved the other
half of the "Schoffner option," the question of admissibility at the guilt
portion of trial of evidence relating to mental condition. The court took
a view directly opposite to that held by Wisconsin and said with some
exasperation that "[a] defendant in -afirst degree murder case has the
right, without reference to a plea of insanity, to establish mental deficiency as bearing upon his capacity to form the specific intent essential
to first degree murder.""6 The recognition of this same right led the
Arizona Supreme court to declare the Arizona bifurcated trial statute
unconstitutional. In State v. Shaw the Arizona court reasoned that
evidence of mental incapacity must be inadmissible at the guilt portion
of trial-otherwise the insanity portion would be redundant. However,
the court found that criminal intent would not exist without sanity. To
remove consideration of sanity could prevent the finding of culpable
intent, an essential element of the crime. This, it was held, the legislature
is without power to do.
Shaw of course rests entirely on its assumption that repetition of
evidence as to mental condition would be so unthinkable that the legislature could not possibly have intended it. This assumption is hardly more
reasonable than the analogous Wisconsin belief that it would involve an
intolerable waste of judicial resources. 0 Both ignore the relative infrequency of the insanity plea.3
The constitutional problems raised both by the shifting of the burden of proof and by the exclusion of evidence relating to mental condition seem to have completely escaped the Wisconsin court. Both issues
were considered in Hebard, and both were given short shrift. The
Hebardcourt first considered the constitutionality of excluding evidence
of mental condition at the guilt phase. In what can only be described as
a bootstrap operation, the court equated due process with fairness or
"Id. at -,
439 P.2d at 748.
2133 Colo. 72, 292 P.2d 189 (1956).
"Id. at 82, 292 P.2d at 194 (emphasis by the court).
21106 Ariz. 103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
"Curl v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 474, 484, 162 N.W.2d 77, 82 (1968).
A. MATTHEWS, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 28 (1970): "[I]n each jurisdiction surveyed, criminal responsibility cases constituted a small percentage of all cases. In Illinois,
Michigan, and Florida only a handful of cases occur each year; there is a somewhat higher
frequency in California and a still higher frequency in the District of Columbia."
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fair play and then went on to hold that fairness would not be served by
depriving a defendant of his right to choose between a single and a
bifurcated trial.-2 Then turning to the constitutionality of shifting the
burden of proof at the insanity phase, the Hebard court largely contented itself with citing Leland. It asserted that the burden of proof on
the essential elements of the crime did not shift 3 and that "as we see
it, a court finding of legal insanity is not a finding of inability to intend;
it is rather a finding that under the applicable standard or test, the
defendant is to be excused from criminal responsibility for his acts."
The court went on to characterize the insanity defense as a plea in
35
confession and avoidance.
This view, as applied in Sprague, approaches a position of strict
liability for homicide, at least with respect to degree: neither the existence of malice nor the formation of a mental purpose to kill may be
rebutted during the guilt portion of trial. Under such a view insanity is
not properly characterized as a defense.
The Wisconsin position as it exists after Hebard and Sprague is
strikingly similar to an earlier California view. In People v. Troche,3 6
in which the California bifurcated trial statute was upheld, the court
stated that evidence of defendant's mental condition was not admissible
at the guilt portion of trial. The court termed bifurcation a mere procedural matter and implied that insanity did not affect the unlawful quality of the act but served rather to explain or excuse it. A companion
case, People v. Leong Fook, 7 made this last premise explicit, although
in Leong Fook the court seemed to recognize that insanity results in an
inability to formulate criminal intent.3 8 The inconsistency of these
statements does not appear to have been noticed by the California court.
These cases, of course, are no longer authority, having long since
given way in California to the concept of "diminished responsibility."
Under this doctrine, evidence of mental disease or defect not amounting
to legal insanity is admitted at the guilt portion of trial.3 1Such evidence
3250 Wis. 2d at 421-22, 184 N.W.2d at 163-64.

11Id. at 422-23, 184 N.W.2d at 163-64.
31ld. at 420, 184 N.W.2d at 163.
mId. at 423, 184 N.W.2d at 164.
"206 Cal. 35, 273 P. 767 (1928).
11206 Cal. 64, 273 P.779 (1928).
31ld. at 71-72, 273 P. at 782.
"People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330,
202 P.2d 53 (1949).
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may negative either the ability to premediate ° or the ability to govern
one's conduct in accordance with the law. 4 Consequently there are
possibilities of jury verdicts of second degree murder12 or manslaughter.43 In the latter case, the mental disorder is regarded as negativing
the ability to act with malice." Under the diminished responsibility
doctrine, evidence of epilepsy would be considered both on the issue of
malice aforethought and on the issue of specific intent.' " In fact, California has recently characterized the condition of epileptic seizure as one
of "totally diminished capacity."46
California's view, as unique as Wisconsin's," has been severely
criticized as defeating the very purpose for which the bifurcated procedure was enacted." Indeed, California's experience with bifurcated trials
was discussed at great length in State v. Shaw49 and may have been a
major factor in the Arizona court's conclusion that the bifurcated procedure was either duplicative or unconstitutional.
Moreover, it can be argued that a resolution of insanity cases in
terms of one's belief as to whether mens rea presupposes sanity involves
a fundamental misconception of issues. The same criticism may be
made of the pendent issues of allocation of the burden of proof of sanity.
Given a disturbed offender, the appropriate inquiry would look to the
degree to which the offender's conduct, in view of his disorder, merits
criminal sanctions. California has at least realized that this question
requires some flexibility in approach. Yet the California procedure has
been criticized as being self-defeating and unreasonably wasteful.
Wisconsin is in a unique position in that it could gain California's
flexibility while retaining its own judicial economy. Its exclusionary rule
operates to postpone the issues of mens rea and sanity until the latter
stage of trial. In effect, its bifurcated trial is a sequential trial on the
issues of actus reus and mens rea. By judicially recognizing this fact, the
'*People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
"People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
"2People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
"People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 322, 411 P.2d 911,918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 822 (1966).
4Id. at 317, 411 P.2d at 916, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 820.
"sPeople v. Williams, Cal. App. 3d -,
99 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1971).
"Id. at -, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
"Compare People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959), with State v. Hebard, 50
Wis. 2d 408, 184 N.W. 2d 156 (1971).
"Comment, The GradualDecay of the Bifurcated Trial System in Californiaand the Emergence of"Partial Insanity": 1966, 3 CALIF. W. L. REV. 149 (1967).
106 Ariz. 103, 109-1I, 471 P.2d 715, 721-23 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971).
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court could undertake a further experiment. At the second phase of
trial, the jury could be instructed on the factors which would lead to a
finding of diminished capacity. Only then would they fix the degree of
offense. Should they find, for example, that the defendant was incapable
of forming the specific intent to kill, the verdict would be second degree
murder. No significant duplication of judicial effort would be involved,
and no repetition of expert testimony would be required.
CHARLES
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Criminal Procedure-Probable Cause and Due Process at Sentencing
The guilt determination process in the American judicial system is
characterized by rigorous procedural and evidentiary standards and extensive appellate review designed to ferret out the slightest harmful
error. The criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is
assured by specific procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights as well
as by the broader fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process of
law. But once guilt is established, all these procedural safeguards seem
to vanish. Although the Supreme Court has said that the sentencing
process is subject to scrutiny under the due process clause,' the extension
of procedural due process safeguards to sentencing has been the exception rather than the rule.' Furthermore, there is normally no substantive
review of sentences in federal appellate courts,3 and the vast discretion
of the sentencing judge remains largely unfettered. This note will examine the criminal defendant's rights during sentencing and will discuss a
case that significantly extends presently recognized due process safeguards surrounding the sentencing process.
Recently in United States v. Weston4 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reviewed the information considered in sentencing a criminal
defendant, vacated the sentence, and remanded, holding that "the Dis'See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 252 n.18 (1949).
2
See Note, ProceduralDue Process at JudicialSentencingfor Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821,
824-25 (1968).
3
See Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15
VAND. L. REV. 671 (1962); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCE 13-15 (Approved Draft 1968). At
present fifteen states make appellate review of sentences available on a regular basis. Id. at 13.
1448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).

